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USING WARNINGS TO EXTEND THE
BOUNDARIES OF CONSUMER SOVEREIGNTY
W. KIP VISCUS*

I.

GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN CONSUMER CHOICES

A variety of social institutions influence consumer choices.
Government agencies provide regulation, Congress and the

state legislatures enact legislation, and the courts enforce legal
rules. The desirability, scope, and character of these limitations

on product choices and consumer behavior vary considerably
across different contexts.
Even within a particular area of intervention, such as
government regulation, considerable heterogeneity exists.
Regulations differ substantially in terms of the extent of the
intervention and interference with consumer choice. In some
as when
cases, products are banned altogether,
pharmaceuticals approved for use in Western Europe have not
been approved for use in the United States. In other cases,
products are restricted to certain consumers, as when only
certified pesticide applicators are licensed to use the more
potent pesticides. There may also be constraints on the type of
product attributes, such as a requirement that a car have air
bags to protect the passengers riding in the front seats.
Regulations can also take a less intrusive form, such as hazard
warnings that provide information concerning the risks of a
product or the manner in which the product should be used.
Legislative interventions have also been quite diverse.
Congress and the state legislatures have levied taxes on
particular products, such as cigarettes, alcohol, and gasoline.
These taxes increase the economic costs of purchase and
consequently decrease consumer demand for the product.
* John F. Cogan, Jr. Professor of Law and Economics and Director of the Program on
Empirical Legal Studies, Harvard Law School. This essay is a revised version of oral
remarks presented at the Federalist Society Eighteenth Annual Student Symposium at
The University of Chicago Law School on April 9-10,1999.
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Efforts to restrict product demand may be more explicit, as in
the case of laws that set a minimum drinking age or a
minimum age for the purchase of cigarettes. Finally, Congress
also provides hazard warnings for products, such as
legislatively required cigarette warnings.
There are other policy objectives that lead to interference
with consumer choice. Governments require money to carry
out their functions. Taxing consumers and products may be a
mechanism for raising these funds, but taxation will necessarily
affect the prices consumers face. Even income taxes interfere at
least in part by altering the labor-leisure choice.
The role of the courts is perhaps most diverse because courts
serve as a mechanism for enforcing both regulatory and
legislative sanctions. In addition, courts govern the scope of
tort liability for hazardous products. Products subject to rules
regarding design defects, inadequate warnings, and similar
limitations may generate tort liability awards against the
manufacturer, and these awards in turn provide incentives for
the manufacturer to make its products safer. Such incentive
effects are not always desirable. Considerable uncertainty
regarding the extent of tort liability as well as the probability of
an extremely large damage award may discourage innovation
in areas in which consumers value products, but for which
there is a danger of unanticipated tort liability.
II. WHY INTERFERE WITH PRIVATE CHOICFS?

Market choices provide for a matching of consumer,
producer, and worker preferences. In idealized market
situations, the unconstrained choices of consumers, coupled
with the provision of goods in the marketplace by competitive
firms, lead to efficient outcomes as consumers select the bundle
of goods they most prefer.1 There may be, however, many
departures from the idealized world. These departures are
described as various forms of market failure, where "market
failure" simply means a failure of market transactions in the
real world to live up to the idealized assumptions
hypothesized by economists.
Perhaps the most notable market failure is that of an effect

1. See HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 203-07 (1978).
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that goes beyond a particular transaction to affect others
adversely, a 2 phenomenon commonly referred to as an
"externality." Common externalities include pollution caused
by firms as part of the production process as well as pollution
caused by consumers, as in the case of environmental tobacco
smoke.3 The existence of such externalities does not imply that
products associated with polluting production processes
should not be produced or that consumers should not be
permitted to consume products that generate pollution.4 It
does, however, provide a rationale for some potentially
productive intervention, such as imposing smoking restrictions
or pollution standards.
A second class of market failures consists of errors in private
decisions. People may make flawed risk judgments, may not
make wise choices involving events with potentially
catastrophic outcomes, and may not think dearly about the
future implications of their current decisions. 5 While there may
be errors of these various kinds, what is of primary interest to
economic analysts is whether these errors are systematic in any
particular direction. 6 For example, a systematic exaggeration in
risk perception could lead to excessive care in particular
domains. Fear of flying and the associated risks of airplane
travel could, for example, lead people to drive even though
driving in fact may be more hazardous.
The welfare consequences of the error, however, must be
evaluated carefully. We make decisions every day for which
we may not have full information. Not all such decisions lead
to negative consequences, however. For example, scientists
still know very little about why aspirin has its beneficial effects.
However, the lack of our knowledge does not necessarily imply
that our decisions are in error or that our freedom to make
these decisions should be constrained. Almost invariably, we
2. See id.
3. See W. Kip Viscusi, SecondhandSmoke: Facts and Fantasy,REG. NO. 3 1995, at 42, 43.
4. For example, the U.S. steel industry and electric power plants are sources of
pollution. However, few have proposed that we eliminate electric power or the
domestic production of steel, even though these enterprises cannot be made pollution
free.
5. See JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES passim (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY] (reviewing
some of the inadequacies of individual choices).
6. For a review of some of the systematic biases in people's risk beliefs, see W. KIP
Viscusil, RATIONAL RISK PoLIcY 5-25 (1998).
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must make decisions with uncertain implications when we fail
to have complete information, whether it be with respect to
today's weather forecast or the chemical composition of the
foods we eat, but this does not mean that these decisions are
mistaken. Furthermore, acquiring information itself is costly, so
that many of the choices we make will be made based on our
subjective assessments of the risk. A substantial literature
indicates that decisions made without certainty are in fact often
more rational than first acquiring information because
7
information acquisition is costly.

While the potential rationales for government intervention
are quite diverse and often compelling, it should also be
emphasized that there are dangers to intervention.8 Consumer
choice plays a constructive role in circumventing these dangers
by enabling consumers to match their product and activity
choices with their own preferences. Indeed, that is the very
nature of the way in which markets operate, based upon the
usual assumption of economic models. In particular, given
their budgets, consumers select the mix of goods and services
that produces the highest level of welfare, given their budgets
and the costs of goods and services. The fact that a market
failure exists does not imply that there is no constructive role
for choice. Nor does it imply that government intervention is
always superior to no intervention. Rather, these issues must
be assessed on a case-by-case basis and will depend on the
relative efficacy of the government policy as well as on the
extent of the consumer market failure.
One potentially attractive way to foster better market
outcomes without interfering with consumer choice is to rely
on hazard warnings and other informational regulations.9
These interventions provide information to consumers that will
enable them to make decentralized decisions more in line with
the kinds of choices that we like to promote. Moreover, it is a
7. See, e.g., HOWARD RAIFFA, DEcISION ANALYSIS: INTRODUcTORY LECTuRES ON CHOICES
UNDER UNCERTAINTY 42-43 (1968) (demonstrating, through a detailed formal analysis,
that the benefits of "buying" information will sometimes fail to exceed the costs).
8. See Viscusi, supranote 6, at 103-05.
9. See generally W. Kip Viscusl & WESLEY A. MAGAT LEARNING ABOUT RISK: CONSUMER
AND WORKER RESPONSES TO HAZARD INFORMATION (1987) (reviewing the economic
benefit! of hazard warnings and other informational policies) [hereinafter LEARNING
ABOUT RISK]; WESLEY A. MAGAT & W. KIP VISCUSI, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO
REGULATION (1992) (same).
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form of intervention that addresses only the particular contexts
of misuse that lead to harm. 0 By contrast, bans on products
and regulations of product attributes eliminate these items
from consumer choice in all contexts, eliminating potentially
useful applications of the product and thereby failing to
maximize social utility.
In this article I will explore the potential role of regulatory
interventions and their efficacy in alleviating some forms of
market failure. While the emphasis will be on the potential
benefits of informational regulations, it should nevertheless be
acknowledged that there remains a substantial role for other
kinds of regulatory interventions as well.
III. ARE CONSUMERS' RISK JUDGMENTS RATIONAL?
There is a tendency to focus on the salience of particular
market failures that may exist in particular consumer contexts.
The Clean Air Act, for example, requires that the
Environmental Protection Agency set ambient air quality
standards without considering their cost, as there is a focus on
the pollution externality rather than on cost-benefit balancing."
However, the existence of market failures, such as a lack of
perfect risk information, does not always imply that there is no
systematic element to market choices. 12 Analysis of people's
choices in risk contexts is perhaps most instructive because that
is an area of choice in which it is often suggested that people
are particularly prone to error.13
Despite the potential shortcomings of people's choices in risk
contexts, the individual rates of tradeoff reflected in riskmoney tradeoff valuations are often quite substantial and
systematic. The most diverse evidence in the literature consists

10. See MAGAT & VISCUSI, supranote 9, at 182.
11. See W. KP VISCUsI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR
RISK 251 (1992).
12. In the case of cigarettes, for which there is a wide range of risk perceptions on the
part of consumers, there is still a systematic element in terms of the price effects on
cigarette demand, as higher cigarette prices lower the quantity of cigarettes consumed.
See W. Kip Viscusi, SMOKING: MAKING THE RISKY DECISION (1992); W. Kip Viscusi,
Cigarette Taxation and the Social Consequences of Smoking, in TAX POLICY AND THE
ECONOMY 51, 78-92 (James M. Poterba ed., 1995). See also Joni Hersch, Teen Smoking
Behaviorand the RegulatoryEnvironment,47 DUKE L.J. 1143,1151-55 (1998).
13. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics &
Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supranote 5, at 4-18.
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of studies of labor market outcomes. 4 Workers will demand a
higher wage rate to face a job that poses extra risk. This
principle was articulated by Adam Smith over two centuries
ago. 15 Using data on worker wages, the risks of these jobs, and
worker and job characteristics, economists have analyzed how
much extra workers are paid for risk and have calculated
implicit values of life based on these estimates.' 6 For example, if
a worker received $500 in extra pay to face an annual risk of
death of one chance in 10,000, the implicit value of life would
be $5,000,000.17 Put somewhat differently, a group of 10,000

individuals, each of whom faces a one in 10,000 chance of
dying, would together face one expected statistical death. As
compensation each member would receive $500, so that
compensating the group of 10,000 individuals for exposure to
the risk would result in a total compensation of $5,000,000 for
the one statistical death.
Although labor market estimates of the implicit value of life
vary depending on the risk level in the sample, the
characteristics of the sample, and the extent to which people
have chosen to incur the risk, most estimates in the literature
cluster in the $3,000,000-$7,000,000 range.18 Thus, there is a
mid-point value of $5,000,000 per life based on labor market
evidence.
These premiums for exposure to job risks tend to follow
expected patterns. Consider the evidence derived from
premiums for exposure to non-fatal risks on the job, which are
measured in terms of the implicit value of on-the-job injuries to
workers. 19 The variations that I will consider are those that
pertain to the respondent's smoking status and whether the
respondent uses seatbelts while riding in a car. The group of
respondents with the highest value for on-the-job injuries
consists of those who do not smoke and who regularly use
their seatbelts. The intermediate group consists of people who
take one of these two different precautions. The group with the
14. See ViscUSI, supra note 11, at 34-47 (reviewing the labor market studies of wage-risk
tradeoffs).
15. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 100 (Modem Library 1937) (1776).
16. See VISCUSI, supra note 11, at 51-59.
17. See id. at 73.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 59-65.
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lowest value for on-the-job injuries consists of smokers who do

not use their seatbelts. These findings are quite consistent with
a recognition of heterogeneous risk-taking behavior in which
those who are most willing to bear risk sort themselves into the
riskier activities, such as taking a dangerous job, acquiring a
hazardous product, or failing to use certain kinds of safety
equipment.
The market evidence on consumer valuations in the context
of product risk is also consistent with these findings.
Researchers have estimated the implicit value of life from
smoke detector and seatbelt use.2 0 There have also been
detailed estimates of the implicit value of life reflected in the
price of cars, based on the principle that safer cars should
command a higher price. 21 These estimates indicate a value of
roughly $3,000,000 per life.22 Similar estimates have been made
with respect to the response of housing prices to hazardous
waste site exposures.23
These estimates suggest that there is some consistency in the
risk-money tradeoff. But are people really cognizant of the
future implications of their actions? Are they myopic in their
behavior, and do they ignore the future consequences of their
risk, whether the risk be that of a job fatality or the hazards
posed by certain products? The evidence in the literature on the
choices people actually make suggests that there is not such
myopia. 24 Analysts have estimated the implicit rates of interest
generated by job choices that affect the worker's fatality risk, as
well as those generated by purchases of used cars that affect
the buyer's fatality risk over the life of the car. In each case, the
estimated rates of interest implicit in the consumer choice are
in the same range as market rates of interest, a result that is
consistent with behavior that at least is broadly rational in
character. 25
20. See id.at 66.
21. See id. 22. See id. at 73. See also Mark K. Dreyfus & W. Kip Viscusi, Rates of Time Preference and
Consumer Valuations of Automobile Safety and Fuel Efficiency, 38 J.L. & ECON. 79, 102
(1995).
23. See Ted Gayer et al., Private Values ofRisk Tradeoffs at Superfund Sites: Housing Market
Evidence on LearningAbout Risk, REV. ECON. & STAT. (forthcoming 1999) (manuscript on

file with author).
24. See VISCUSI, supra note 11, at 101-04, 111-14 (reviewing evidence on consumer
myopia and worker myopia with respect to job risk choices).
25. See id.; Dreyfus & Viscusi, supranote 22, passim.

HeinOnline -- 23 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 217 1999-2000

HarvardJournalofLaw & Public Policy

[Vol. 23

IV. ARE CONSUMERS' RISK JUDGMENTS ACCURATE?

People are not always fully informed about all the
consequences of their actions. This is true not only for
hazardous products, but also for most of the choices we make.
For example, all students entering law school do not know who
their post-law school employer will be or what their salary
level will be upon graduation, but they nevertheless choose to
enter. The key concern is whether errors in risk judgments are
large. Do they have severe welfare consequences? Can we learn
over time and improve our choices? Can risk communication
potentially alleviate the informational shortcomings and lead
us to make sounder choices? Perhaps the biggest problem is
hidden risks about which consumers may be completely
ignorant.
Our definition of full information for consumer decisions
falls short of requiring complete information. For example, we
do not need to know all the chemical constituents of the food
we eat or the mechanical nuances of the machines we operate. 26
Similarly, we do not need to know all the adverse
consequences of a risky act and their full implications for our
future welfare. What is important is that people be aware of
some adverse consequences and the associated probabilities for
consequences that are sufficiently large so as to appropriately
deter people from undertaking risky behavior to the same
extent as would be the case if they had perfect information. It is
thus essential that people understand enough of the
consequences and the probabilities of their occurrence that they
will have the correct incentives with respect to both product
choice and product use.27 In the case of product use, there also
must be knowledge of appropriate precautions and their
efficacy.
A common assumption in discussions involving imperfect
information is that there is systematic underassessment of the
risks.28 Lack of perfect information and errors in risk
26. We typically take on faith that eating broccoli and spinach is good for us, but it is

unlikely that a great majority of the citizenry could give precise chemical breakdowns
of these foods.
27. For a formal model of the influence of risk information on levels of consumption,
see W. Kip Viscusi, Cigarette Warnings: The Perils of the Cipollone Decision, 3 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 239,242-51 (1993).
28. For example, a principal underpinning of strict liability is that consumers may
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perception, however, do not always imply underestimation of
the risk. In fact, the opposite is more likely to be the case for
relatively infrequently occurring risks, such as those associated
with most consumer products. Figure 1 summarizes the risk
beliefs for a sample of almost 500 individuals. 29 On the
horizontal axis is the natural logarithm of the actual number of
on ofPfm and ctuaMxIityIslis
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deaths from various causes. The vertical axis gives the natural
logarithm of the perceived number of deaths for almost 30

different causes. If risk beliefs were the same as actual risk
levels, then the pattern of responses would lie along the 45
degree line sketched in Figure 1. However, as Figure 1 shows,
people have a tendency to overestimate low probability events
and underestimate larger risks. Thus, rare events such as
botulism, fireworks accidents, and lightning strikes, all of
which lead to relatively few deaths, tend to be overestimated.
By contrast, the more fundamental risks to our lives, such as
the risks of stroke, heart disease, and cancer, tend to be
underestimated.
Another implication of Figure 1 is that people will place too
underestimate the risk associated with products. In the case of products liability, such
an assumption of underestimation of risks is needed to justify any constructive role of
liability in creating safety incentives. If risk perceptions are adequate, market outcomes
will be efficient. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, REFORMING PRODUcrs LIABILITY 62-65 (1991).

29. These statistics are based on a consumer survey undertaken by the author in 1998 in
Phoenix, Arizona. Respondents were given the total number of deaths in each year
associated with automobile accidents and were asked to estimate the total number
deaths associated with a series of other sources of mortality.
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great a weight on reductions in risk that reduce the risk to zero.
Because of the overestimation of small risks, elimination of
these small risks will produce more of a perceived reduction in
risk than has in fact occurred.
There is a quite different implication of Figure 1 for changes
in risk that do not result in a complete elimination of the risk.
As shown by the fact that this curve is flatter than the 45degree line, when there is a reduction in risk, people will tend
to underestimate how much the risk has declined relative to the
actual risk decrease. The practical result of this perceptional
bias is that people may tend to underestimate the safety
improvements associated with using safety equipment such as
seatbelts.
Other anomalies and apparent irrationalities documented in
the literature pertain to aspects of the risk other than its
magnitude. 30 The degree of ambiguity concerning the risk is
often a salient concern. People tend to overreact to risks that
are ambiguous. They would, for example, prefer to face a
known risk level of 10 in 10,000 rather than have a 50-50 chance
of either a 5 in 10,000 risk or a 15 in 10,000 risk of an adverse
event. 31
Risk changes often produce extreme results, particularly to
the extent that these risk increases lead to a change from an
accustomed risk level. For example, consumers overreact to
increases in product risks.32 Once there is a disruption in the
accustomed risk level, most consumers would either refuse to
buy a product or would require a considerable price cut in
order to find the product attractive. 33 Newly publicized
product risks consequently tend to generate consumer alarm
that, in a democratic society, will lead to pressures for
potentially excessive government regulation.
The data in Tables 1 and 2 illustrate these patterns. They
show information on consumer responses to changes in risk for
household chemical products. 34 The first set of risk pairs,
inhalation and skin poisoning, pertains to risks faced by adult
30. For a review of these anomalies, see VISCUSI, supranote 6,passim.

31. This effect is often called the Ellsberg Paradox. See Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity,
and the Savage Axioms, 75 Qj. ECON. 643,643-669 (1961).
32. Evidence on this phenomenon is presented in Table 2.
33. See infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.

34. These tables are drawn from MAGAT & VISCUSI, supranote 9, at 60-63.
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consumers of insecticide. The second risk pair, inhalation and
child poisoning, represents the risks faced by the children
living in the respondents' households. The third risk pair,
gassing and eye bums, pertains to the risks faced by adult
consumers of toilet bowl cleaner. The fourth risk pair, gassing
and child poisoning, pertains to risks faced by children living
in the household of a consumer of toilet bowl cleaner. In each
case the initial risk level was 15 injuries of each type per 10,000
bottles used.
Table 1
Marginal Valuations of Reducing Both Risks by 5/10,000
Incremental Willingness to Pay (Dollars/Bottle)
Starting
Inhalation Inhalation Gassing Gassing Risk
Skin
Child
Eyeburn
Child
(Injuries/
Poisoning
Poisoning
Poisoning
10,000
Bottles)
15
1.04
1.84
0.65
0.99
10
0.34
0.54
0.19
0.24
5
2.41
5.71
0.830.99
The first row in Table 1 gives the average consumer's
willingness to pay in terms of an additional amount per bottle
for a product that would reduce the risk from 15 in 10,000 to 10
in 10,000. For the various risks described, these amounts range
from $0.65 to $1.04. Consumer willingness to pay for the next
incremental risk reduction from 10 in 10,000 to 5 in 10,000 was
less, ranging from $0.19 to $0.54 per bottle. The final risk
reduction from 5 in 10,000 to 0 yielded considerably higher
estimates, particularly for the insecticide product, where the
willingness to pay ranged from $2.41 per bottle to $5.71 per
bottle. Consumers clearly place a premium on complete
elimination of the risk, and this premium reflects the
overvaluing of such risk reductions and the zero-risk mentality
that may bias consumer decisions.
How might consumers react if the product risk were
increased a bit? Table 2 (see below) reports on these responses
for the same set of risk pairs as in Table 1.
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Table 2
Responses to Risk Increase (+1, +1) Valuation Questions*
Percentage for Whom Product
is Too Risky to Purchase
Inhalation 77.2
Skin
Poisoning
Injury Pair

Mean Value ($/Bottle)
of Positive Responses
2.86

Inhalation Child
Poisoning

68.1

3.19

Gassing -

61.5

5.52

74.3

1.28

Eyeburn
Gassing -

Child
Poisoning
*This question asked subjects what price discount they would require on
the new product to accept an additional risk of 1/10,000 for both injuries,
starting with risks of 15 injuries per 10,000 bottles sold for both injuries.

The survey initially asks consumers how they would
respond to a risk increase of 5 in 10,000, which is symmetric
with the risk decreases valued in Table 1. The responses were
so strongly negative that they threatened the integrity of the
survey. As a result, the focus was on very minor risk increases
of 1/10,000 for each of the two risk components. Despite
making the risk decrease quite small, the majority of
consumers-as high as 77% for the risk pair of inhalation and
skin poisoning-would refuse to buy the product at any price.
Thus, consumers were unwilling to take a product discount
and even were unwilling to use the product for free when
compensated for using the risky product. As for the minority
of consumers who were willing to purchase the product, they
required a substantial price cut-as high as $5.52 per bottle for
the risk pair of eye burns and gassing. It is noteworthy that the
mean value of the price decrease consumers required in
response to a risk increase of 1 in 10,000 exceeded the amount
that consumers were willing to pay for a risk decrease from 15
in 10,000 to 5 in 10,000 based on the results in Table 1. Thus,
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consumers were at least ten times as averse to risk increases as
they were to small risk decreases, assuming that they were
willing to buy the riskier product at all. Consequently, newly
publicized risks will generate very strong consumer reactions
and intense pressures for government regulation.
The role of publicity is also quite surprising. One might
expect that the more information people receive about risks, the
more likely they are to make accurate risk judgments. 35 As it
turns out, highly publicized risks for the most part tend to be
overestimated. 36 The substantial attention given in the press to
risk does not convey probabilities regarding the risk, which
would tend to foster more accurate risk judgments, but instead
highlights the total death toll associated with the risk. The
result is that people tend to overestimate the frequency of
occurrence of highly publicized events. This publicity accounts
for much of the overestimation of risks for dramatic events
such as fireworks accidents, lightning strikes, and natural
37
disasters.
Publicity concerning risks often takes the form of experts
from different camps disagreeing about the risk.38 What, for
example, happens when the industry insists that the risk is low,
but the government believes that the risk is high? When experts
disagree and are representing different sets of interests, the
surprising result is that consumers do not simply average the
estimates. 39 Rather, consumers tend to place the greatest weight
on the worst case scenario.40 Thus, there is a tendency to
overestimate the risk as compared to what would happen if
respondents simply averaged the risk judgments of the

35. By definition, providing full information will enable people to form perfect risk
judgments. However, more information that is not complete, such as providing
information regarding the numerator of the risk (i.e., the total number of people killed)
but not the denominator (i.e., the number of people exposed to the risk) will not
necessarily produce accurate risk judgments.
36. See Barbara Combs & Paul Slovic, Newspaper Coverage of Causes of Death, 56
JOURNALISM Q. 837,838-43 (1979).
37. See id. The author's survey that formed the basis for Figure 1 also supported this
conclusion.
38. For example, the American Medical Association and the head of the Food and Drug
Administration disagreed about the risk associated with breast implants. See W. Kip
Viscusi, Alarmist Decisions with DivergentRisk Information, 107 ECON. J. 1657, 1658 & n. 5
(1997).
39. See id. at 1668.
40. See id. at 1668-69.
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competing experts. 41 What these and the other results suggest
is that the various heuristics and biases affecting risk
judgments do not always lead to risk underestimation, but that
in many cases they do lead to overestimation and overreaction
to product risks.
The net effect of these various biases in risk perception is
mirrored in risk judgments regarding risky products. Table 3
(see below) provides estimates of the risk beliefs for cigarette
smoking based on national surveys undertaken in 1985 and
1997 as well as regional surveys that I undertook in 1991 for
North Carolina and in 1998 for Massachusetts. 42 The first set of
questions pertains to risks associated with lung cancer. Based
on the best scientific evidence available, the lung cancer
mortality risk level is between 0.05 and 0.10.43 Actual risk
beliefs are considerably higher even for smokers, with all
estimated lung cancer risk being at least 0.31 for the four
surveys indicated. 44
Based on the Surgeon General's estimates, the total mortality
risk associated with smoking is between 0.18 and 0.36. 45 Once
again, there is a pattern of overestimation of the risk, even by
smokers. 46 The upper bound estimate of the true risk lies
beyond the average risk estimate that smokers attach to
mortality risks.47
Even if people understood the probability of death, they still
might not understand the expected length of life lost as well.
The last panel in Table 3 reports two different wordings for the
life expectancy question, and in each case there is a substantial
misperception of life expectancy loss. Since the average life
expectancy loss across both men and women is seven years for
the entire population, the estimated life expectancy loss figures
in Table 3 exceed the scientific reference points in every case.

41. See id. at 1668-70.
42. For a fuller discussion of this data, see VISCUSI, supra note 12, passin. Except for the

1991 survey, these efforts were all undertaken in support of the defense in the cigarette
litigation. See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374 (M.D.N.C. 1997), revd sub
nom. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1998), cert.
granted,119 S. Ct. 1495 (1999).
43. See VISCUSi, supra note 12, at 7.
44. See id. at 7,75-77.
45. See id. at 80.

46. See id. at 79-81.
47. See id.
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Table 3
Summary of Smoking Risk Perception Results

Risk Estimate
Risk Question (Sample)
Full Sample Current Smokers
Lung Cancer:
Among 100 smokers, how many
of them do you think will get lung
0.43
0.37
cancer because they smoke?
(U.S., 1985)
Among 100 smokers, how many
of them do you think will die
from lung cancer because they
smoke? (N.C., 1991)
Among 100 smokers, how many
of them do you think will develop
lung cancer because they smoke?
(U.S., 1997)
Out of every 100 smokers, how
many of them do you think will
die from lung cancer because
they smoke? (M.A., 1998)
Total Mortality:
Among 100 smokers, how many
of them do you think will die
from lung cancer, heart disease,
throat cancer, and all other illnesses
because they smoke? (N.C., 1991)
Among 100 cigarette smokers, how
many of them do you think will
die from lung cancer, heart disease,
throat cancer, or any other illness
because they smoke? (U.S., 1997)

0.38

0.40

0.47

0.40

0.48

0.42

0.54

0.47

0.50

0.42

And out of every 100 cigarette smokers,
how many of them do you think
0.54
will die from lung cancer, heart
disease, throat cancer, or any other
illness because they smoke? (M.A. 1998)

0.46
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Table 3 continued
Risk Question (Sample)
Life Expectancy Loss:
The average life expectancy
for a 21-year old male (female)
is that he (she) would live
another 53 (59) years. What
do you believe the life expectancy is for the average male
(female) smoker? (N.C., 1991)
As you may know, an average
21-year old male (female) would
be expected to live to the age of
73 (80). What do you think the
life expectancy is for the average
male (female) smoker?
(U.S., 1997)
As you may know, an average
21-year old male (female) would
be expected to live to the age of
73 (80). What do you think the
life expectancy is for the average
male (female) smoker?
(M.A., 1998)

Risk Estimate
Full Sample Current Smokers

8.5
(males)

6.9
(males)

13.2
(females)

10.9
(females)

10.1
(males)

7.9
(males)

14.8
(females)

12.3
(females)

10.1
(males)

8.6
(males)

15.9
(females)

13.2
(females)

Cigarette smoking poses substantial risks. However, these
risks have been highly publicized and have been the target of
mandated government warnings. 48 By all objective measures,
the result is that people tend to overestimate or misunderstand
the risks associated with smoking.49
A fashionable but misguided literature hypothesizes that
people suffer from optimism bias and cognitive dissonance. 50
48. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1994).
49. See VISCUSI, supra note 12, at 79-81.
50. See Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Susceptibility to Health Problems:
Conclusionsfrom a Community-Wide Sample, 10 J. BEHAVIORAL MED. 481, 494-96 (1987)
[hereinafter Weinstein, UnrealisticOptimism]; Neil D. Weinstein, Why It Won't Happen to
Me: Perceptions of Risk Factors and Susceptibility, 3 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 431 (1984)
[hereinafter Weinstein, Why It Won't Happen to Me].
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This literature suggests that even though they assess the risks
of bad outcomes associated with smoking, cigarette consumers
do not believe that the adverse effect will happen to them. This
criticism pertains not just to cigarettes, but to the whole range
of risks posed by jobs and products.
Notwithstanding these claims of optimism bias, there is
evidence that the economic effect of these risk beliefs is
consequential. Higher perceived risk levels generate substantial
compensating differentials for risk in terms of higher wages for
risky jobs and lower prices for hazardous products.5 ' If people
suffered from an optimism bias and truly believed that it
would not happen to them, they would dismiss these risks as
being inconsequential for the choices they make as consumers.
In much the same way, the higher the risk people believe
52
smoking poses, the less likely they are to smoke.
Much of the source of the apparent optimism bias may be a
result of the framing of the risk question. Respondents are
typically asked whether they are above average or below
average in terms of the risks they face from a particular source.
Such comparisons with an average individual in effect ask
people to find fault with themselves,5 3 something that most
people are unwilling to do. For example, most people do not
view themselves as below average drivers5 4 Similarly, few
respondents may be willing to admit that they are truly below
55
average in terms of their use of safety precautions.
In an earlier study funded by the Environmental Protection
Agency to test this optimism bias hypothesis, we focused on
how respondents viewed the risks of child poisoning in their
households. When asked whether their household posed above
average or below average risks to children, virtually all
respondents indicated that they lived in a comparatively safe
household that was below average in risk.56 Nevertheless,

51. See VISCUSi, supranote 11, at 80-81.
52. See VIsCusl, supranote 12, at 89-95.
53. See Weinstein, Why It Won't Happen to Me, supra note 50, at 485-87.
54. This type of effect as well as consumers not wishing to believe that they are above
average in riskiness is discussed in James R. Bettman et al., Cognitive Considerationsin
PresentingRisk Information, in LEARNING ABOUT RISK, supra note 9, at 17.
55. See id.
56. See MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note 9, at 21-44; Wesley A. Magat et al., Risk-Dollar
Tradeoffs, Risk Perceptions,and Consumer Behavior, in LEARNING ABOUT RISK, supra note

9, at 95.
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when asked whether they would be willing to pay more for
safer consumer products to protect their children against child
poisoning risks, their estimates were inordinately large and
reflected a substantial overvaluation of risk decreases. When
concrete consumer choices were at stake, the apparent
optimism bias from a comparative question did not translate
into a failure to reveal a substantial valuation of risk.
V. HAZARD WARNINGS AS A POTENTIALLY EFFECTIVE PoLIcY

If consumers are informed of the risks, then there is
substantial evidence that they can make reasonable decisions in
a wide variety of contexts 5 7 The difficulty in many instances is
that consumers may not be aware of the particular hazards
posed by the product or how precautions can reduce these
risks.58 Although one could always ban the product altogether,
such a brute force policy would deprive consumers of a
potentially valuable product. Hazard warnings can potentially
eliminate the informational problem while keeping the product
on the market.
When thinking of informational approaches to regulation,
one should not limit the menu to on-product warnings alone. A
broader hazard communication system might include public
service announcements, training programs, and other
mechanisms for providing information that will enable people
to make sounder risk decisions.5 9 For simplicity, however, I will
refer primarily to on-product warnings as the mechanism for
informational transfer.
The key criterion for judging a warning is the extent to which
it provides new information in a convincing manner. The
evidence in the literature suggests that warnings that simply
serve as reminders do not have a consequential effect on
consumers' decisions. 60 Rather, consumers need a credible
warning that tells them what they did not already know before
or that enables them to refine their judgments regarding a risk

57. See VIscusI, supranote 11, passim.
58. See MAGAT & viscusi, supra note 9, passim (discussing the role of hazard warnings

in eliminating each of these sources of market imperfection).

59. See VIScuSi, supra note 28, at 139-42 (discussing broadly the various means of
providing information about risk).
60. See id. at 140.
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that they did not fully understand previously. 61
Substantial evidence indicates that hazard warnings can
influence risk beliefs. Warning labels for asbestos, TNT, and
other hazardous chemicals in the workplace affect workers'
risk perceptions in the expected manner. 62 As a result of their
beliefs that the work is riskier, workers require higher wages to
work on these hazardous jobs, and they quit if their wages are
not increased. 63 Warning labels emphasize the discrete choice
whether to be exposed to the risk on a particular job or whether
to buy a risky product. 64
A second type of warning is directed at influencing
precautionary behavior, given that the consumer has already
chosen to purchase the risky product or work on the hazardous
job. 65 An example of this type of warning is the set of warning

instructions on drain openers. These warnings advise the
consumer to wear rubber gloves while using the product and
to store the product in a childproof location.6 6 These warnings
increase the level of precaution-taking by consumers, but they
do not achieve 100% compliance because different consumers
assess different costs to undertaking these precautions. 67
Cognitive limitations and potential errors in risk judgment
do not simply affect people's initial risk perceptions. These
factors also influence how hazard warnings are processed and
the kinds of warnings that will be successful. 68 Due to cognitive

limitations, the information format, structure, and content all
affect whether the hazard warning will be successful in
achieving the intended effect on risk behavior.69 Individuals are
limited in terms of their information processing capabilities so
that information overload is frequently an issue.
61. See id. at 141-46.
62. See W. Kip Viscusi & Charles J. O'Connor, Adaptive Responses to Chemical Labeling:
Are Workers Bayesian DecisionMakers?, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 942,948-55 (1984).
63. See id. at 953-55.
64. Warning labels for cigarettes and for the tooth staining risks of tetracycline are also

of this type.
65. See generally MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note 9 (exploring the various warnings that
affect precautions); LEARNING ABOUT RISK, supranote 9 (exploring same).
66. See MAGAT & VISCUSI, supranote 9, at 108-12.
67. See W. Kip Viscusi et al., The Effect of Risk Information on PrecautionaryBehavior, in
LEARNING ABOUT RISK, supranote 9, at 76-80 and tbls. 4.3,4.6,4.8.

68. See Bettman et al., supranote 54, at 14-31.
69. See id.
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In an earlier study for the Environmental Protection Agency,
Wesley Magat and I found that hazard warnings that include
very detailed risk information confuse consumers. 70 These
warnings conveyed so much detail regarding the potential
ramifications of using the product that consumers could not
identify the specific precautions that were most important for
avoiding the product risk.7 Warnings that included much less
detail, but which were more narrowly focused on the essential
information, were more successful in conveying to consumers
the knowledge they needed with respect to the appropriate
precautions. 72

Overly detailed warnings are not the result of market forces,
but instead are the consequence of regulatory and liabilityrelated pressures. For example, the EPA specifically approved
the pesticide warnings that were the object of the study.
It is also noteworthy that stronger warnings are not
necessarily better. Excessive warnings distort relative product
risk comparisons. If, for example, we were to label everything
in the supermarket as dangerous, then consumers would be
unable to draw any distinctions as to which products merit
additional care.73 Excessive warnings also could threaten their
own credibility, leading consumers to dismiss such warnings
altogether.
An additional factor that should influence warnings policy is
that a common format for warnings is often desirable. 74 Unlike
the usual economic prescription that freedom of individual
choice enhances welfare, 75 in this instance a common format
may assist consumers in processing the warning information. 76
For example, when considering different warnings for
prescription drugs, the Food and Drug Administration
approved a structure that promotes commonality in the
organization of the information about the product. This
70. See MAGAT & VIsCUSI, supra note 9, at 88-92.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 169-71 (showing that hazard warnings on conventional consumer items
can lead consumers to believe that such items are just as hazardous as cigarettes, which
in fact are much more dangerous).
74. See Bettman et al., supranote 54, at 28.
75. This effect is due to the fact that fewer constraints always are better in terms of
increasing one's options.
76. See Bettman et al., supra note 54, at 29-30.
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enabled consumers to locate instructions for use and hazard
warnings in a similar location on different products, making
information acquisition easier.77 Similarly, a common warnings
vocabulary in which words such as "poison," "danger,"
"warning," and the like have a similar meaning across
products enables people to make sounder judgments about the
consequences of that particular product for their welfare. 78
VI. CRITERIA FOR REGULATORY AND LIABILITY REFORM

The overall implication of these results is that the usual
presumption of an irrational consumer is not warranted. Risk
perceptions are not always accurate, but risk underestimation
is not the norm.
The absence of perfect information does not necessarily
imply that products need to be banned and that consumer
choices need to be limited. Properly designed hazard warnings
are often preferable. Indeed, there may even be a problem of
excessive incentives for producers to overwarn because of
substantial tort liability judgments, hazard warning cases, and
various government regulations.
The potential advantages of warnings are considerable. In
any market context there is typically substantial heterogeneity
in individuals' willingness to bear risk and in the kinds of
products they prefer. Hazard warnings enable consumers to
make decentralized choices for the products that best promote
their welfare. Moreover, relying on a warnings strategy rather
than a policy that interferes with consumer choices eliminates
the potential welfare losses from more obtrusive forms of
government intervention.

77. See VISCUSI, supranote 28, at 51.
78. See id.
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